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KENNETH M. ROSEN*

Company Law and the Law of Succession Droit
Commercial/Commercial Lawt
Topic III. A
This Report explores the intersection of company law and the law
of succession in the United States of America. U.S. company law features a complex variety of business entity forms, available in different
U.S. states, with their own legal rules related to important issues such
as the how much ownership is separatedfrom control. The death of an
owner, and the potential distribution of her rights and interests to
heirs, can be a significant turning point in a business entity's life as
personal succession and business succession intersect. This paper offers a structurefor understandingthe complexity of the U.S. system by
examining some potential legal effects of the death of an owner and by
identifying a set of key factors of the U.S. approach to succession issues. Significant factors include the federalist nature of the U.S.
system, the importance of small and family-owned businesses, and an
emphasis on freedom of choice in business entity governance. Considering why these factors are critical to understanding the U.S.
approach offers general insight into the current state of U.S. law as
well as possible directions the law might move in the future.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Business succession is a critical issue for the economy. If businesses are the factories that manufacture growth and wealth, then
succession may offer both the opportunity for factory upgrades as
well as the danger of a shut down as businesses transition into a new
* Associate Professor, The University of Alabama School of Law. The author
thanks his colleagues in the American Society of Comparative Law and the participants in the 2014 Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law in
Vienna, Austria for the opportunity to serve as the U.S. Reporter on company law and
the law of succession and to collaborate on the exploration of this important matter.
In addition, he thanks Professor Frank Gevurtz for comments on this paper. The author also thanks his colleagues at The University of Alabama School of Law and the
University of Alabama Law School Foundation for their generous support of his research. He also thanks Caroline Cease and Thomas Bridges for excellent research
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era. Better understanding how different jurisdictions provide a legal
infrastructure for business succession offers insight into those jurisdictions' potential to succeed and a reflection of the values and
priorities of those jurisdictions.
The United States of America takes an approach to this infrastructure that may share components and differ in some respects
from that of other nations. The U.S. approach to business succession
is complex. In part, this reflects the variety of business entity forms
that may further vary under the laws of the different U.S. states and
that also may affect the treatment of succession issues. A key component of business entity law is to what extent that law provides for the
separation of ownership and control of the entity. The extent of separation may be especially important as it relates to the impact on the
entity of the death of one or more of its owners. Behind business entities often are real persons, who own but may or may not manage the
entity.' Thus, personal succession may be intricately interwoven with
business succession. The death of an owner, and the potential distribution of her rights and interests to heirs, can be seen as a potential,
significant turning point in the business entity's life as personal succession and business succession intersect.
It would be impossible in a limited report to describe every legal
issue related to business succession and the rules adopted by each
relevant state and federal law-maker to address every issue. Accordingly, in reporting on the U.S. approach and dealing with such
complexity, this paper's key aim is to offer a structure for understanding the complexity of the U.S. system by examining some
potential legal affects of the death of an owner and further by identifying a set of key factors of the U.S. approach to succession issues.
Considering why these factors are critical to understanding the U.S.
approach offers general insight into the current state of U.S. law as
well as possible directions the law might move in the future.
Accordingly, this Report proceeds by first looking at how the
death of an owner and succession potentially triggers the intersection
of rules from multiple legal subject matter areas, particularly business entity and trust and estate laws. Second, the Report explores the
impact of the federalist nature of the United States and the roles assigned to states and the federal government that might affect
succession. Third, the Report examines how the significance of small
and family businesses in the U.S. economy might affect one's understanding of succession issues. And, fourth, the Report evaluates U.S.
approaches as reflecting a more deeply embedded normative value of
freedom in the U.S. legal infrastructure. Exploring in turn each of
1. Of course, entities might own other business entities as well. However, as one
goes through even a complex ownership structure, one generally will find at some
point real persons, even if that is several layers of ownership away.
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these major facets of U.S. law related to business succession offers
insight into both the current state of U.S. law as well as its potential
further evolution.
II.

LEGAL SUBJECT MATTER NEXUS POINT

An initial, critical characteristic of U.S. law on business and personal succession is that such law is not a single subject matter area of
law standing on its own. Rather, succession situations potentially implicate numerous areas of law-and the normative values reflected in
those different areas of law. Thus, the event of succession is characterized by serving as a type of nexus point between different legal
subject matter areas. The term nexus derives from the Latin for "'a
binding together"' 2 and circumstances of business succession may necessitate the melding of principles and rules from different areas of
law. For instance, the type of business entity involved may dictate
legal implications for succession and which areas of law dominate. As
this paper's title suggests, two areas of particular interest are business entity law and the law of trusts and estates. However,
additional legal subject matter areas may come into play as well. Accordingly, it becomes useful to explore briefly how the individual
death of an owner might have different impacts on a business under
different legal circumstances.
A.

Business Entity Law

U.S. business entity law is noteworthy for the wide range of permissible business entity forms. These may range from businesses
operated by individuals as sole proprietorships to large, public corporations. Certainly, corporations may get much attention and spring
to mind when one considers U.S. company law. 3 The law surrounding
corporations has been subjected to extensive study.4 Such study
reveals that even when one refers to a particular business entity form
such as a "corporation," great diversity may exist leading to nuances
for the law applying to different corporate entities.5 One can add to
this the fact that there are numerous other business association
forms beyond corporations such as partnerships and limited liability
2. See Definition of Nexus in English, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://oxforddiction
aries.comnus/definition/american english/nexus (last visited Oct. 1, 2013).
3. In recent times, public attention on corporate scandals may exacerbate the
inclination to focus on corporations. Indeed, such scandals tend to draw both public
and regulatory attention. See Kenneth M. Rosen, "Who Killed Katie Couric?" and
Other Tales from the World of Executive Compensation Reform, 76 FORDHAM L. REV.
2907, 2908-09 (2008).
4. See generally FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW (2d ed. 2010); ROBERT
CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW (1986).

5. For example, closely held corporations have interesting legal issues associated
with them. See GEVURTZ, supra note 4, at 471-550.
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companies with their own subspecies and sets of rules .6 The narratives surrounding the emergence of different types of business
entities tell the story of different mixes of legal rules to address particular concerns. 7 Thus, to understand company law's role in
succession means to first appreciate multiple sets of rules applicable
to a wide range of business entities.
1.

Entity Law Basics and Succession

Company law itself may define certain basic aspects of entity
transitions and succession. Some business entities achieve a status
equivalent to legal personhood. For instance, the law's conception of
corporations as "legal persons" introduces a variety of concerns.,
Once an entity is itself a legal person created pursuant to company
law, it becomes clear how the law of creation also may help define
when such an entity ceases to exist in its current form and fades
away or turns into something else. This situation illustrates a type of
business succession moment governed, at least in part, by business
entity law. For example, Chapter 14 of the Model Business Corporation Act provides for the dissolution of a corporation. 9 Such
dissolution might be voluntary, 10 administrative," or judicial, and
has legally prescribed ramifications related to each.' 2 For instance,
in the case of a voluntary dissolution, corporate existence can continue for the winding up and liquidation of the entity with the
possibility of transference of shares in the corporation.' 3 There are
also provisions for handling claims against the corporation.' 4 Such
provisions are important as they ultimately might affect what is left
to distribute to shareholders as part of the succession moment.
Of course, there also are moments of succession, in a broader
sense, at corporations that might not have reached the finality of dissolution. This broader sense of succession could include transitions of
who manages and controls the corporation. Company law covering
corporate governance is particularly relevant here. At the heart of
traditional U.S. corporate law is a governance norm of the separation
of ownership and control; in many corporations, the shareholder own6. See generally CHARLES R.T. O'KELLEY & ROBERT
AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 3-4 (6th ed. 2010)

B.

THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS

7. See, e.g., Susan Pace Hamill, The Origins Behind the Limited Liability Com-

pany, 59

OHIO ST.

L.J. 1459 (1998).

8. See CLARK, supra note 4, at 675-703.
9. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§14.01- 14.05 (2011). As discussed further below,
the Model Business Corporation Act is not itself legally binding, but is a model statute
that states may choose to use as their binding law. See Part I1, infra.
10. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§14.01-14.09 (2011).
11. Id. §§ 14.20-14.23.
12. Id. §§ 14.30-14.34.
13. See id. §14.05 (describing "effect of dissolution").
14. See id. §§14.06-14.07.
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ers are not directly in charge of the management of the company,
which is left to the board of directors and corporate officers. 15 In addi16
tion to the corporate governance rules establishing such norms,
company law corporate governance rules further provide for the elec7
tion and dismissal of those in control of corporation's management.'
Shareholders' ability to indirectly influence the corporation's path by
electing and removing directors, as further constrained by the
method of elections and removal, can critically affect their true
power.' These company law based rules can affect greatly the ability
to transition from one group of leaders to the next.
It is worth emphasizing at this point that not all corporations in
the United States are large or publicly held ones. Some family and
other corporations may be closely held by more limited numbers of
shareholder owners. Such entities may be subject to special rules
both under public law and under private arrangements by the owners. These entities, sometimes labeled as "close" corporations, can be
defined differently in various jurisdictions.' 9 As a practical matter,
separation of ownership and management in the governance of these
entities may not be as formally separated in some of these entities as
in larger, publicly held corporations.2 0 For instance, shareholders
may expect to be employees of the corporation or have other more
active roles. 2 ' Such entities also may trigger special concerns about

15. See

O'KELLEY

& THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 153-58 (contrasting roles of direc-

tors, officers, and shareholders).
16. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP.

ACT, § 8.01 (2011) ("All corporate powers shall be
exercised by or under the authority of the board of directors of the corporation ....
");

Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 141 (noting authority of board of directors over major corporate
matters).
17. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 8.02-8.06 (governing election and terms of
directors); §§ 8.07-8.09 (governing resignation and removal of directors); § 8.43 (governing resignation and removal of officers).

18. See MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT, §§ 7.01-732 (2011) (governing shareholder meetings, voting, and voting trusts, voting agreements, and shareholder
agreements); see also Kenneth M. Rosen, Mickey, Can You Spare a Dime? DisneyWar,
Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, and Business Law Pedagogy, 105
MICH. L. REV. 1151, 1162-65 (2007) (noting views of shareholder power's importance

in corporate governance debate).
19. See F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL & THOMPSON'S CLOSE
CORPORATIONS AND LLCs: LAW & PRACTICE § 1:2 (3d ed. rev. 2013). While many close

corporations may be smaller enterprises, size is not necessarily determinative of
whether an entity falls into a close corporation regime. See id., § 1:3. Even the term
"close" corporation may have different meaning in different jurisdictional settings
from "closely held" or similar terms and can certainly differ in aspects from similar
non-corporate entities such as limited liability companies. See id., §§ 1:4-1:10. It is
not within the scope of this paper to delineate all of the possible variations, but rather
to note that special rules may be associated with each.
20. See id., §§ 1:13.
21. See id.
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oppression of minority shareholders and attempts by the law or pri22
vate agreement to protect such minority stake owners.
Moreover, after focusing on the law of corporations, it is important to note, if one selects a non-corporate business entity form in the
United States, she also must be aware of the rules related to that
particular entity that similarly might affect succession. For instance,
returning to an issue discussed earlier in the corporate context, partnership law may have its own rules for dissolution. Article 8 of the
Uniform Partnership Act contains provisions related to winding up a
partnership form of business. 2 3 Interestingly, some parties might
avoid or prefer using the partnership form because of its inherent
volatility, as there are multiple events that may cause dissolution
and winding up the business. 2 4 Among these in some instances, if
steps are not taken to prevent it, is the possibility that dissociation by
one partner may trigger dissolution. 25 Dissolution again represents a
major transition of succession and rules related to the transition
under partnership law. For example, as the entity is dissolved, the
Uniform Partnership Act provides for settling accounts amongst partners, which may in some instances leave surplus for distribution to
partners.26 Interestingly, the Uniform Partnership Act specifically
provides for some situations, beyond the dissolution of the entity, to
situations involving the death of a partner. It makes clear that "[t]he
estate of a deceased partner is liable for the partner's obligation to
27
contribute to the partnership."
Of course, the end of a life of a business entity under company
law can become even more complex when the succession involves
transference of assets to another entity. Where an existing entity
&

22. See generally F. HODGE O'NEAL
ROBERT
SON'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND

B.

&

THOMPSON, O'NEAL
THOMPMEMBERS (2d ed. rev. 2013).

LLC

Classically, one concern is the possibility of a squeeze out of minority shareholders
from their ownership interests and avoiding unfair valuation of their interests. See
generally id.
23. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT §§ 801-807 (1997). Again, as with the Model Business
Corporation Act, one must be cautious that the Uniform Partnership Act itself is not
binding law but may be utilized by states. See supra note 9. Other types of partnerships and business entities similarly may have their own rules. See, e.g., UNIF. LTD
LIAB. Co. ACT §§ 701-08 (2006) (providing for winding up and dissolution of limited
liability companies);

UNIF. LTD P'SHIP ACT §§

801-808 (2001) (providing for limited

partnership dissolution).
24. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 801 (1997).
25. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT §§ 601-03; 801 (1997).
26. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 807 (1997). For instance:
(a) In winding up a partnership's business, the assets of the partnership,
including the contributions of the partners required by this section, must be
applied to discharge its obligations to creditors, including, to the extent permitted by law, partners who are creditors. Any surplus must be applied to
pay in cash the net amount distributable to partners in accordance with their
rights to distributions under subsection (b).
See id.
27. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 807(e) (1997).

2014]

COMPANY LAW AND THE LAW OF SUCCESSION

seeks to have assets moved to it, one might have a combination
through a sale or merger in a variety of ways. 28 State corporation
statutes can play a significant role in determining how combinations
proceed as these statutes are set up to, among other things, protect
shareholder interests. 2 9 Moreover, in the United States, an outgrowth of the increasingly large assortment of entity forms under
state company law is the desire to better accommodate transactions
involving them. These might include conversion of an entity from one
business entity form to another as well as combination of entities of
different forms. 30 From the 1980s, one saw multiple states adopt
their company law to be more accommodating with, for example, Delaware permitting mergers of corporations with limited partnerships,
joint-stock associations, nonprofit corporations, and partnerships and
31
Texas "broadly [authorizing] cross-entity conversion and merger."
2.

Death of an Owner, Personal Succession, and Company
Law

Understanding some of these basic concepts in business succession, one can proceed to view them alongside personal succession.
Having recognized that company law's distinctive rules for different
entities directly affect transitions in governance and entity succession, one can draw some specific linkages to the affect of the death of
an owner. While alive, as indicated above, a strategic owner likely
may choose to invest in a particular type of entity to serve specific
goals. Among these may be the desire to exercise greater or lesser
control over management of that entity. Some investors may choose
to be passive regarding most management functions, for instance,
buying shares of a large publicly held corporation and perhaps not
even exercising their minimum rights to cast ballots in director elections or for other matters. To the extent these investors participate in
an entity with a legally limited managerial role for shareholders,
such limitations may pass forward to their heirs after death as those
heirs take ownership of shares.
However, if a strategic owner chose to invest in an entity to attempt to exert greater managerial control-for instance, to secure
personal employment or other influence on decision-making-when
she dies, her heirs may or may not have claim to the greater manage28. See CLARK, supra note 4, at 401-61.
29. See id. at 414-18. Of course, applicable law may extend beyond state corpo-

rate codes to other rules such as the federal securities laws and antitrust laws. See
id. at 413-18.
30. See Robert C. Art, Conversion and Merger of Disparate Business Entities, 76
WASH. L. REV. 349 (2001).
31. See id. at 379. When the Model Business Corporation Act initially moved into
reform in this area in 1999, it interestingly chose to focus on permitting corporations
to merge with "'other entities,"' rather directly accommodating conversions. See id. at
380.
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rial role or privileges. This outcome may hinge on specific managerial
rights associated with particular owners under different entity forms
provided by public law or on how iron-clad are private agreements
among the decedent and other owners on managerial participation
for themselves and their heirs. For instance, during her lifetime, she
might enter into a shareholder agreement with fellow owners that
not only governs certain voting of shares but also provides that the
agreement is binding on heirs and gives the opportunity for her heir
32
to sign and to join the agreement after she is deceased.
And, the strategic owner may have different aspirations on the
control issue for themselves as compared to her heirs. For instance,
an owner who sought active managerial control during her lifetime
might anticipate ceding such control for the next generation after her
death. Various motivations might inform such a desire. For example,
in a more closely held entity that restricts who may buy shares in the
entity to avoid the introduction of new, unfamiliar owners, the current owner might be concerned about liquidity for her estate and the
ability of her heir to transfer ownership given such transfer restrictions after her death. Thus, during their lifetimes, the owners might,
33
for example, agree to a buyout agreement triggered by death.
In summary, it is clear that U.S. business entity law has an important role to play for informing business succession, and that as
that entity law continues to provide for more entity types it also
evolves to address what happens when entities cease to exist as they
once were. However, an analysis of business succession would be far
from complete without examining other areas of law at the nexus
with company law during a business succession. Which area of law
dominates at the nexus may vary by circumstance. For instance, the
significance of those other areas of law may fluctuate with the nature
of the business entity at issue and the details of coverage of succession-related issues by the company law for those entities. Another
legal area with potentially large impact is U.S. trust and estate law.
32. See, e.g., O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 19, § 1:2. Prior planning and antici-

pation of death can be useful for other owners as well as the decedent. All of the
owners might avoid some problems if they anticipate the death of one of their number
early in the entity's existence. They might consider the advantages and disadvantages

of arrangements for disposing of the decedent's shares, including various alternatives
such as placing shares in trust or buying insurance to allow payment of an estate for
shares. See id., § 2:27.
33. See id., § 7:3. Another issue might arise related to death and transfer restrictions. During an entity's lifetime, especially in more closely held entities, owners
might informally choose to ignore transfer restrictions otherwise present in writing to
allow transfer of shares to family members or others. This leaves open the danger, at
a later time of less cordial relations, for attempts to stop such an informal tradition
based on the written restrictions; of course, the prior informal conduct might or might
not lead a court to refuse to enforce the restriction at a later point in time. See id.,
§ 7:15.
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Trust and Estate Law

Trust and estate law is an excellent example of another area of
U.S. law that is relevant, because it illustrates that when thinking of
other relevant areas of law, relevance may come either directly or
indirectly. The more direct relevance may come from trust and estate
law directly settling how assets of a business are dispersed during a
business succession. But trust and estate law also may come into play
indirectly as it informs the more detailed settlement of issues related
to succession from other legal areas.
1. Direct Relevance
As noted above, the company law governing some business forms
may contain relatively detailed instruction on certain succession issues. This was a natural result as partnership law became codified
and other business entity forms were statutorily created. If one engages in a program of codification, it may make sense to cover
succession-related issues where possible as part of that project. Of
course, as also reflected above, details may vary for company law's
coverage of different entities. And, it is important to note that many
businesses may be run as sole proprietorships that largely are the
alter egos of their individual owners rather than constituted in a business organization form with detailed legal constraints. 3 4 In such
instances, for example, if the business owner dies, that passing may
result in the business assets settling into the trust and estate legal
system to determine how to proceed properly with succession.
U.S. law in this area can be quite varied in the results for specific
jurisdictions. 35 However, as a general matter, the possibility exists
for addressing numerous issues under trust and estate law. For instance, there is the possibility of a business owner's demise without a
will plunging one into the trust and estate law of intestate succession. 36 Jurisdictions may have rules to deal with a variety of issues
such as the share of the estate for surviving spouses or other rela39
tives, 37

34. See

the

possibility

of

O'KELLEY & THOMPSON,

statutory

wills,

38

heirs'

gifts,

supra note 6, at 1-2 (describing sole proprietor-

ships). This is not to say that such businesses are unregulated. They may be subject to
a host of law and rules. For example, agency law may be especially significant. See,
e.g., id. at 20-21; see also Kenneth M. Rosen, FinancialIntermediaries as Principals
and Agents, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 625 (2013) (discussing generally significance of

revisiting agency law, including traditional principles developed at common law). The
point is that rules for some issues related to succession, such as governance, may not
be developed in the same way as they are for other business entities.
35. See infra Part III for additional discussion of the U.S. state by state approach.
36. See generally WILLIAM M. McGOVERN, ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 49132 (4th ed. 2010).
37. See id. at 49-65. For spouses, one interesting question possibly covered by le-

gal rules is who constitutes a spouse. See id. at 121-32.
38. See id. at 67-68 (noting promulgation of statutory wills by some states as an
alternative for lay persons where boxes might be ticked to show desires rather than
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advancements, 40 homicide, 4 1 disclaimers, 42 and children who are not
from marriage, 43 adopted 4 4 or the result of using reproductive
45
technology.

A sole proprietor who chooses to anticipate her death and to try
to arrange for her business' succession may have a variety of legal
options to give effect to her intent from simple wills to the creation of
more sophisticated trusts. While freedom of choice is large, 4 6 constraints may exist. Some jurisdictions may limit testamentary
power. 47 And, even when giving is legitimate, to successfully execute
her plan, she should be mindful of the variety of legal formalities associated with wills, trusts and other conveyance vehicles; failure to
observe formalities might question the legitimacy of efforts after
death.

48

As different business entity forms under U.S. company law have
proliferated to meet the needs of users, it is useful to note that the
U.S. legal system also has evolved to provide very sophisticated vehicles for those achieving great wealth in business to see that their
wealth is delivered to causes close to them. For example, the Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation formed by the Microsoft co-founder and
his wife has an asset trust endowment of over $38 billion.4 9 The foun-

dation's size makes it a significant entity in its own right, and it is
not surprising that the Gates' family embarked during their lifetime
on forming this enterprise separate from the Microsoft company as a
way to share its wealth.
Notwithstanding the above stated significance of trust and estate
law for business succession, it is useful to refer back to the previous
section's discussion of company law. While trust and estate law is
sophisticated and varied across the United States, that law's ability
to directly control business succession again may relate to the busiaccruing the expense of having a lawyer draft a will.) Of course, even attorneys might
use statutory wills, especially more sophisticated ones being created such as the Uniform Statutory Will Act. See id. at 68.
39. See id. at 68-71 (noting use of the term heirs, even when a will is drafted,
possibly drawing in interpretations from intestate succession rules).
40. See id. at 74-79 (noting some states making adjustments to account for certain
advancements to those who end up as heirs by a decedent prior to death).
41. See id. at 80-88 (noting rules possibly barring taking by will, will substitute,
or inheritance by possible heir who killed the decedent).
42. See id. at 88-96 (noting rules where an otherwise legitimate heir may decline
inheritance by intestate succession for reasons such as tax consequences).
43. See id. at 96-107 (noting importance of rules when many children are born out
of wedlock).

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 107-117.
id. at 117-121.
infra Part V.
supra note 36, at 133-96.
id. at 197-253.
Who We Are Foundation Fact Sheet, BILL AND
McGOVERN ET AL.,

MELINDA GATES FOUNDA-

http://www.gatesfoundation.org/Who-We-Are/General-Information/FoundationFactsheet (last visited Oct. 2, 2013).
TION,
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ness entity form at issue, causing corporation, partnership or limited
liability company law, for instance, to apply more directly on numerous issues instead of laws such as intestate succession. However, this
does not mean that trust and estate law might still not apply in part,
albeit more indirectly.
2.

Indirect Relevance

Indirect relevance of trust and estate law to succession for more
sophisticated business entities might come in several forms. Accordingly, it is useful to contemplate an example. For instance, although a
corporation's legal personality continues despite the death of a shareholder, what happens to the decedent's shares upon death is relevant
and may be affected by trust and estate law covering those shares as
part of the property of her estate.5 0 Who inherits those shares pursuant to trust and estate law may affect the future of the corporation.
As already discussed, shareholders-particularly shareholders with
large holdings-may have power in corporate elections governed by
company law that select the directors empowered under company law
to control the corporation's affairs. 5 1 Trust and estate law's ability to
indirectly affect business succession, even where it does not directly
control all succession issues, should make another point lucid: other
areas of law also might be informative and apply in some instances,
further crowding the nexus created by business succession.
3.

Beyond Business Entity and Trust and Estate Law

It is useful to briefly amplify how areas of law beyond business
entity and trust and estate law may become relevant by exploring
some examples. First, other areas of law might enhance or substitute
for business entity and trust and estate law as they affect business
succession. Recent U.S. legal action regarding same-sex marriage reinforces this point. The United States Supreme Court recently made
major rulings in this area including recognition of the entitlement of
married same-sex couples to federal benefits.5 2 Efforts to be more inclusive in our conception of families, and more generally to adjust
attitudes related to sexual orientation,5 3 necessarily implicate concepts that arise under trust and estate law and that can accordingly
affect business succession. For instance, just as same sex marriage
50. Trust and estate law may not always be independently dispositive on this issue either. For example, there may be a transfer restriction agreement in place. See
F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL & THOMPSON'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCs: LAW & PRACTICE § 7:20 (3d ed. rev. 2013).

51. See supra Part II.A.

52. See Adam Litpak, Supreme Court Bolsters Gay Marriagewith Two MajorRulings, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2013.
53. See, e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller, Obama Ends 'Don'tAsk, Don't Tell' Policy, N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 2011 (noting move towards open service regardless of sexual orienta-

tion in the military).
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has evolved as a legal issue, so too may concepts of who has inheritance and other rights under trust and estate law.5 4 Ultimately,
those issues may be settled directly in trust and estate law by altering statutes fully across the nation to more explicitly recognize rights
for additional family under that law. In the interim, however, the development of new ideas in other areas of the law, like family law and
employee benefits law, might buttress broader interpretations of who
is eligible under business succession schemes.
Second, other areas of law may be so important as to affect which
choices are made under business entity and trust and estate law that
ultimately also affect business succession. Tax law illustrates this
point. As already noted, tax concerns may have led to the development and uses of additional business entity forms5 5 and also can
affect choices about accepting a share of inheritance under trust and
estate law.5 6 Accordingly, the best student of U.S. business succession law will recognize that it is importantly characterized by a nexus
of many types of law. She also will recognize another important characteristic: the significance of federalism.

III.

FEDERALISM

Under the United States Constitution, the drafters decided not to
centralize all legal authority in the federal government. Rather,
much is left to state law, and this is particularly the case for business
entity and trust and estate law. Accordingly, another key characteristic of law applicable to business succession is that its details vary
from one state to another. Notwithstanding the large state presence,
however, it also is important to recognize trends of the federal government to get involved in some of the relevant legal areas.
A.

Role of State Law

State law plays a major role in business entity and trust and estate law. For business entity laws there can be variances between
states on legal rules, such as the ones mentioned above, related to
business succession. In corporate law, for instance, states codes may
differ. Some have seen this diversity possible under a federalist system as particularly beneficial, allowing states to serve as laboratories
for different rules as they compete to attract companies. 5 7 Empirically, certain states with their own company law rules such as
54. Indeed, legal disputes related to same sex relationships already have been
percolating in the trust and estate legal system. See McGovern et al., supra note 36,

at 130.

55. See Hamill, supra note 7.
56. See supra note 42.
57. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 4-6 (1993).
Interestingly, it appears that one technique of companies that faced barriers because
of the proliferation of different types of business entities to merger or to conversion
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Delaware have been particularly successful at attracting business
seeking to incorporate.58 Regardless of one's view of the federal system, 5 9 one must recognize its significance in the United States. For
business succession, for instance, the details of shareholder voting
rights under a particular state's corporate law can affect their ability
to effect transitions to new directors and management. Moreover, differences between state laws have led to the creation of choice of law
rules for the corporate arena that can affect which state's law will
apply on particular issues. The internal affairs doctrine provides that
courts often look to the state of incorporation, which is not necessarily the state of the company's principal operations, for determining
60
which law governs the inner workings of a corporation.
Of course state corporate law differences may naturally lessen
over time as states amend statutes in response to other states' statutory innovations. 6 1 And, other efforts may encourage rule
harmonization over longer periods of time for different types of company law. The United States is home to a variety of model company
related laws put out by different organizations such as the American
Law Institute, 62 the American Bar Association, 6 3 and the Uniform
Law Commission.6 4 However, just the presence of multiple organizations promoting visions of what the law should be shows the lack of
uniform views on the details of U.S. company law. Moreover, these
model acts are not legally binding themselves, and must be adopted
by those with law-making authority in states. Adoption might include
legislatures amending company law statutes 65 as well as judges
drawing on these models, not as binding in themselves, but as representative of what those judges believe the law in their jurisdictions to
66
be.
Trust and estate law, which so greatly might affect business succession, similarly can differ from state to state rendering conflict
rules in this area particularly important as well.6 7 While uniform
laws, such as the Uniform Probate Code and Uniform Trust Code, are
present in this area to promote harmonization, they may be followed
might be to go to another state with more receptive rules and to set things up so that
state's receptive rules applied. See Art, supra note 30, at 379-81.
58. See ROMANO supra note 57 at 6-12.
59. Cf. Carey, infra note 71.

60. See

GEVURTZ,

supra note 4, at 35.

61. See Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in CorporateLaw, 8 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW 709 (1987).
62. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE.

63. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT (2011).
64. See, e.g., UNIF. LTD LIAB. Co. ACT (2006); UNIF. P'SHIP ACT (1997).

65. But even when a legislature largely adopts provisions from a model law, it
may also include some of its own variances from the model law provisions.
66. See, e.g., Ne. Harbor Golf Club v. Harris, 661 A.2d 1146 (Me. 1995) (utilizing
American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance).
67. See McGOVERN ET AL., supra note 36, at 27-38.
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even less than certain business-related uniform laws. 6 s Even rules
that seem nearly universal in the different states can have a major
variant in some jurisdictions. For instance:
in all states, if an individual dies without a will, the surviving spouse gets a share of the estate, but the size of that
share differs. When the law of foreign countries is taken
into account, the differences may become greater. Nearly all
American states reject a "forced share" for children of a person who
dies with a will, but most other countries provide for
9
6

this.

Once again, to the extent that trust and estate law drives results in
business succession, these nuances and variants might lead to different succession outcomes in different states.
B.

The Trend to Federalize Law

Notwithstanding that business entity law often is driven by the
states, more recently, a trend worth recognizing is the federalization
of business entity law, particularly in the corporate world. Certainly,
corporate scandals heighten public, and thus federal government interest, in regulation of corporations. 70 However, these concerns are
not entirely new. In the 1970s, Professor William Cary famously
speculated as to why so many corporations from around the United
States chose to incorporate in the state of Delaware, and wrote of "the
movement to the least common denominator" in corporation stan71
dards and called for consideration of a greater federal role.
For many years, the federal government has been heavily involved in the regulation of securities. 7 2 As time progressed, the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) used its
statutory authority to become more involved in the regulation of corporate processes, such as proxy voting,7 3 that might be viewed as
governance issues more traditionally handled by the states. However,
SEC efforts in this area were not always successful or unopposed. For
instance, efforts to secure greater shareholder rights to participate in
the director nomination process have extended over numerous years
and encountered various hurdles.7 4 While these efforts may not always yield quick implementation of federal rules, they are efforts
68. See id. at iii.
69. Id. at 27 (footnotes omitted).
70. See Rosen, supra note 3.
71. See William L. Cary, Federalismand CorporateLaw: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
72. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
73. See

THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION

2005).
74. See, e.g., Rosen supra note 3, at 2940.

358-89 (5th ed.
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that need to be considered for impact on the business succession process, since the U.S. federalist system includes both state and federal
law. Beyond considering the federalist character of U.S. law affecting
business succession, ascertaining the deeper nature of the law also
involves recognizing certain cultural preferences that effect the U.S.
law's creation. The first of these preferences is reflected in the significant presence of small and family businesses in the U.S. economy.
IV.

SMALL AND FAMILY BUSINESS COROLLARY OF THE
AMERICAN DREAM

U.S. recognition of the impact of small and family businesses on
the American economy is another critical characteristic of business
succession law. Admittedly, not all family businesses remain small
nor are all small businesses run by families. However, it is useful to
group small and family businesses together since their importance to
business succession links to their cultural significance in the United
States. They both can be linked to notions of the "American dream"
that inform and permeate U.S. legal policy. While that dream is
sometimes associated with specific material accomplishments, such
as the purchase of a home, 75 at a more basic level the dream is about
the ability for personal success and prosperity. As they are created,
family and small businesses are ways for family members or close
associates to enter the economy in a small way with the hope of growing the enterprise.
There is a reality associated with this dream. In the United
States, these types of businesses may be very significant to the economy. PwC's 2012/2013 Family Business Survey offers interesting
insights into at least some family businesses.7 6 Even in economically
difficult times, almost three-quarters of surveyed businesses experienced growth in sales. 7 7 Moreover, 90% of these businesses viewed
themselves as significant for job creation.7 1 Similarly, great emphasis
has been placed on the importance of small businesses to the econ79
omy and the large percentage of workers employed by small firms.
The perceived significance of small and family businesses translates into special attention from policy-makers.8 0 For example, the
75. See Kristen David Adams, Homeownership: American Dream or Illusion of
Empowerment?, 60 S. C. L. REV. 573 (2009).
76. Playing Their Hand, US Family Businesses Make Their Bid for the Future,
PwC, http://www.pwc.comus/en/private-company-services/publications/assets/pwcfamily-business-survey-us-report.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2013).
77. See id. at 7.
78. See id. at 9.
79. See Todd McCracken & Dan Danner, Commentary: The Economy Needs Small
Business, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2011, available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com
2011-12-11/business/35286873 1 small-business-small-business-small-firms.
80. Some actually have noted lack of uniformity on conceptualization of what
businesses are small and have questioned benefits awarded based on perceptions of
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White House emphasizes its focus on supporting these entities.,,
8 2
Such support includes lending activity to assist these businesses.
Legislators also focus on these entities both in specialized committees8 3 and in the work of other committees.8 4 This potentially
impacts business succession in various ways.
The support for and prevalence of small and family businesses
are significant because such entities may focus on specific succession
strategies. Family businesses in particular care about succession, although not all successions are easy or without challenges.8 5 Some
have identified succession for family business as "the final test of
greatness."8 6 The PwC survey found that 81% of surveyed businesses
were family-run for multiple generations, but that a quarter anticipated changing ownership in around five years.8 7 Of the latter group,
52% hoped to pass the business onto another generation to both run
and own, 24% to pass the business on to the subsequent generation to
only own, and then another 16% to sell to other companies or private
equity investors.8 8 If the economy incentivizes and holds an important place for entities that are particularly interested in succession
issues, then one can declare previous legal issues associated with succession to be only more important. In addition, these issues may be
even more nuanced for small and family businesses as those entities
the significance of small business. See, e.g., Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Down-sizing the Little
Guy Myth in Legal Definitions, 98 IowA L. REV 1041 (2013); Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Why is
Small Business the Chief Business of Congress?, Rutgers L.J. 1 (2012). For purposes

of this paper, it is important to recognize regardless of one's views of how appropriate
is the policy significance placed on small business, as a practical matter small business does draw great attention of policy-makers.
81. See Jobs & The Economy: Putting America Back to Work, Supporting Small
Businesses, http://www.whitehouse.gov/economy/business/small-business (last visited
Oct. 2, 2013).

82. See id.; see also FY2014 CongressionalBudget Justificationand FY2012 Annual Performance Report, U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 1-4, http://www.sba.
gov/sites/default/files/files/l-508-Compliant-FY-2014-CBJ%20FY%202012%20APR.
pdf (describing Small Business Administration plans for assisting entities).
83. See, e.g., House Committee on Small Business, http://smallbusiness.house.
gov/; Senate Committee on Small Business & Entrepreneurship, http://www.sbc.sen
ate.gov/public/.
84. For instance, the House Committee on Financial Services has paid particular
attention to the passage and implementation of the JOBS Act, including its desired
effect of assisting start-up businesses. See House Passes JOBS Act DeadlineBill and
Homes for Heroes Act, Press Release, Committee on Financial Services, http://www.
sbc.senate.gov/public/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2013).
85. See ROGER FRITZ, WARS OF SUCCESSION, THE BLESSINGS, CURSES AND LESSONS
THAT FAMILY-OWNED FIRMS OFFER ANYONE IN BUSINESS (1997). Family businesses

also may use legal business planning strategies as a means to not only deal with
control issues but estate planning concerns. See, e.g., GEVURTZ, infra note 92, at 82223 (describing freeze strategy for estate planning where elderly owners pass common
stock to younger family members but keep preferred raising valuation questions.)
86. See CRAIG E. ARANOFF & JOHN L. WARD, FAMILY BUSINESS SUCCESSION: THE
FINAL TEST OF GREATNESS

(1992).

87. See PwC supra note 76, at 17.
88. See id.
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might use law, such as governance rules, to deal with their special
challenges such as the power dynamics of a small number of owners
perhaps joining against the owner of a minority stake in the business.
However, it is important to note that the "mom and pop" business
also might be challenged to select the best legal solutions for their
firms and are constrained by realities of family life in addition to the
9
law.
Just as family and small businesses may affect the understanding of succession issues because of their prevalence given U.S. values,
it is useful to explore the influence of another U.S. value, freedom,
that is characteristic of the U.S. version of the business succession
law.
V.

FREEDOM

Law's relationship with freedom is complex in that law can be a
vehicle for both enhancing and limiting freedom.9 0 On the enhancement side, law's support of freedom of contract and choice in
formulating legal relationships can be critical. 9 1 In the United States,
business succession law is quite open to parties ultimately modifying
rules in some circumstances and choosing certain paths for the law's
application. This makes the role of legal counsel critical in the United
States and has led to emphasis on business planning assisted by
92
lawyers.
Previously discussed U.S. business entity law related to business
succession reflects the prioritization of freedom in the U.S. system.
Choices certainly abound. Parties can choose both their business entity form and a particular state with its own set of rules for that
selected entity form. But the choices go further than selecting a form
and jurisdiction.
Corporate law exemplifies this. Corporate codes may provide default rules, but they also typically provide charter options. Delaware
law illustrates these options. In Section 102 of the Delaware General
Corporation Law, after describing the contents of the certificate of
incorporation, in subsection (b), Delaware permits the certificate to
include a host of additional provisions at the option of the firm that
89. See Benjamin Means, Nonmarket Values in Family Businesses, 54 William &

Mary L. Rev. 1185 (2013). And, in addition to ex ante contractual, legal solutions, one
should not under appreciate potential judicial intervention to protect minority shareholder rights in closely held entities. See Benjamin Means, A ContractualApproach
to Shareholder Oppression Law, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1161 (2010).
90. See Kenneth M. Rosen, Freedom, 62 ALA. L. REV. 1023 (2011).
91. See id. at 1026.
92. See, e.g., FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 1-26 (4th ed. 2008).
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can dramatically alter the firm's operations. 9 3 Model laws similarly
9 4
provide options.
In addition to the freedoms inherent in U.S. statutes that might
affect businesses, additional instances of the exercise of choice as it
relates to rules are noteworthy. A corporation may choose to list on a
stock exchange to enhance the liquidity of trading in its shares. By
making that choice, the corporation voluntarily agrees to comply with
that exchange's listing standards which may include significant regulation of the firm's governance.9 5
Choices made through private agreements are not limited to corporations listed on stock exchanges. Partnerships often are heavily
reliant on modifying default rules through a partnership agreement.
Under the Uniform Partnership Act, partners are governed by a partnership agreement, but have the Act's default rules come into play
when the agreement does not cover an issue.9 6 Although the partnership agreement cannot waive certain aspects of the Act, 97 it can be
critical in adjusting rules related to significant issues including business succession. As previously noted, the Act contains dissociation
and dissolution provisions.98 One way to avoid dissolution upon dissociation of a partner is to provide for this eventuality in a
partnership agreement. Such provision could significantly clarify
how a partnership will transition by business succession to new situations as partners depart for a variety of reasons.
The importance of freedom of choice extends beyond business entity law issues to trust and estate law issues that might affect
succession. The ability for individuals to create wills and trusts is
about deciding how their assets, which might include businesses, will
move to others after their deaths. Given this potential for freedom, it
is not surprising that trust and estate law seeks to give effect to the
decedent's intention. 99
Recognition of the freedoms embodied in U.S. trust and estate
and business entity laws becomes crucial. Because if the freedoms are
not exercised, other rules from intestate ones to company law code
rules may automatically apply.
93. See Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 102. Indeed, the options have expanded over time to

include items such as the elimination of certain personal liability of directors. See
Rosen, supra note 34 at 637-39.
94. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT, § 2.02(b) (2011) (noting provisions that may

be in articles of incorporation).
95. See, e.g., NYSE, LISTED

COMPANY MANUAL,

available at http://nysemanual.

nyse.comllcm/.

96. See

UNIF. P'SHIP ACT §

103 (1997).

97. See id.
98. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
99. See ROGER W. ANDERSEN, UNDERSTANDING TRUSTS AND ESTATES 32 (3d ed.
2003) (noting that evaluation of whether to enforce a will might hinge on issues such

as the intent for a document to be a will and the intent of the document's provisions).
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VI.

405

CONCLUSION

Given the inherent complexities of U.S. business succession law,
including its coexistence with personal succession rules, this paper
sought to provide a framework of critical characteristics of that law to
help provide a better understanding of how the law operates and to
provide a basis for comparison to succession laws in other jurisdictions. The lesson of U.S. law is that succession law is characterized by
a need to manage multiple sets of legal rules from different subject
matter areas that converge on the nexus of a business succession. In
addition, one must recognize the federalist nature of the U.S. system
and its impact on the laws applicable in this area. That nature requires attention to both state and federal law. Finally, for a deeper
understanding of the U.S. rules, one must appreciate the values that
drive them. This includes the priority placed on small and family
businesses in the U.S. economy and the devotion to free choices as
businesses prepare for succession.
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